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Abstract 
Over the past few years, Japan has been witnessing the emergence, regeneration, and 
spread of micro-relational forms of cohesion, solidarity, and responsibility in response 
to the ryūdō-ka shakai and hikikomori phenomena. These terms refer to the crisis of 
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social relations and cooperation, which commenced after the collapse of the Japanese 
economy in the early 1990s. While scholars, particularly sociologists and 
anthropologists, have consistently inquired into these micro-sites of civic friendship and 
responsibility, their juridical status is yet to be ascertained. This article argues that the 
paradigm of societal constitutionalism developed by Gunther Teubner can be of 
precious assistance in conducting such an assessment. In particular, it offers a 
contextualisation of Teubner’s reflections on constitutional pluralism and 
fragmentation of social functions from the perspective of Kiyoshi Hasegawa’s state-
centric scholarship on the regulatory dynamics of neighbourhood associations as micro-
relational communities in suburban areas.  
 
Keywords 
 
Societal Constitutionalism; Ryūdō-ka shakai; Hikikomori; Micro-relational orderings; 
Gunther Teubner; Kiyoshi Hasegawa  
 
 
 
A particular is given, and only given, within relations1 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
As is well-known, after growing for more than two decades at incredibly high rates, the 
Japanese economy collapsed between late 1991 and early 1992, leading to a long period of 
economic stagnation known as the “lost two decades” (ushinawareta nijūnen). The breakdown 
was caused by the burst of the asset price bubble (baburu keiki). As one could expect, Japan’s 
economic decline and the (for the most part) inadequate political responses to it have led to 
destabilising macro-level transformations which have been significantly affecting the country’s 
social dimension.2 One such development, at the centre of this article, is the proliferation of 
social withdrawals—a phenomenon which, as Anne Allison has recently observed, takes shape 
in “the rhythm of social impermanence: relationships that instantaneously connect, disconnect, 
or never start up in the first place.”3 Unsurprisingly, the voiding of the Japanese’s sense of 
civic-embeddedness and community-belonging has attracted a considerable degree of attention 
both in and outside Japan for a variety of reasons. These include (but are not limited to) the 
                                                          
1 Benjamin (2015), p. 19. 
2 Funabashi & Kushner (2015). 
3 Allison (2013), p. 8. 
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fact that, particularly since the Edo period, dating 1600-1868, social order and stability have 
been achieved by prioritising community concerns over local and individual interests—an 
approach revolving around such political concepts as giri (expected behaviour) and wa 
(harmony);4 that individual (i.e. one’s own as well as others’) dignity (jinkaku) represented 
“the fundamental concept of post-war democratic education;”5 and that such crisis originated 
during a period, the early 1990s, when “[m]acro- rather than micro-management strategies . . . 
prevail[ed].”6 
To be sure, as Hannah Arendt reminded us, humankind has been witnessing “mass 
phenomena of loneliness”7 since the modern “rise of the social”8 voided the ancient public-
private distinction of its political significance. It is indeed not a coincidence that the humanising 
properties of public life were outlined for the first time by the philosopher who stressed the 
ethical-political character of friendship, Aristotle.9 Similarly, it is not by accident that the father 
of republicanism, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, urged humanity to move away from a societal 
condition in which, rather than fighting against each other as Thomas Hobbes had depicted, 
“everyone is isolated from, and completely indifferent to, everyone else.”10 Yet, while it was 
commonly thought that this ontological condition was somehow confined to Western societies 
only, the number of studies which have emerged over the past few years exploring the 
Japanese’s modes of social precarity and marginalisation is testament to the need for moving 
the scholarly debate on the subject beyond traditional assumptions and categorisations.11 
In the search for conceptual effectiveness and analytical coherence, scholars have come to 
deploy as well as borrow from each other a set of specific terms to address the multiple 
                                                          
4 For a brief survey of the legal scholarship on the subject, see Corne (1990), pp. 347–350. More broadly and 
critically, see van Wolferen (1990), p. 202, p. 304, and pp. 314–7. For a urban planning and development account, 
see Sorensen (2004), pp. 11–113; Yorifusa (2006), pp. 25–33. 
5 Inoue (2012), p. 313. 
6 Waswo (1996), p. 159. See also Sorensen (2006), p. 109; Feldhoff (2007), p. 92. 
7 Arendt (2012), p. 59. 
8 Arendt, supra note 7, p. 68. See also id. (2005), p. 141. 
9 Agamben (2009). 
10 Cassirer (2009), p. 259. See also Nancy (1991), p. 9. 
11 Among others, see Allison, supra note 3; Abe (2010); Horiguchi (2012); Kingston (2012); id. (2014); Shirahase 
(2014); Roberts & Orpett Long (2014); Iwata-Weickgenannt & Rosenbaum (2014); Pejović (2014); Baldwin & 
Allison (2015); Chiavacci and Hommerich (2017). See also the (2016) 36(2) Special Issue of Japanese Studies 
on ‘Family at the Margins: State, Welfare and Wellbeing in Japan’. 
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declensions and repercussions of the “anguish of everyday life”12 experienced by the Japanese. 
The most recurring ones are ryūdō-ka shakai (liquid society), muen shakai (relationless 
society), kyōsō shakai (competitive society), kakusa shakai (disparity society), kodoku 
(loneliness), ningenkankei no hinkon (poverty of human relations), ibasho ga nai (without a 
belonging), and ohitori-sama no rōgo (aging alone). Above all, one term has, however, become 
widespread not only in sociological and anthropological studies on these forms of social retreat 
and existential isolation, but also in contemporary everyday parlance: hikikomori (social 
withdrawal). Given the irreducible “ontological register”13 of relationality, it comes as no 
surprise that some commentators have come to emphasise the ontological character of the 
phenomena in question.14 
What has emerged from the literature on the subject is that since the midst of the first “lost 
decade,” which almost dramatically coincided with the Great Hanshin earthquake of 1995, the 
Japanese have been increasingly adopting or renovating micro-relational modes of civic 
friendship, solidarity, and responsibility in response to the failure of macro-developmental 
policies and crisis of macro-forms of cohesion and cooperation.15 By these terms it is meant a 
vast array of cohesive arrangements such as those revolving around local civil society 
organisations,16 including  neighbourhood associations (jichikai or chōnaikai; NAs17) and 
community networks; joint-ventures in rural areas;18 and interpersonal relationships arising 
from the activity of those incorporated, non-profit organisations (including NAs) which have 
                                                          
12 Allison, supra note 3, p. 2. 
13 Benjamin, supra note 1, p. 3. 
14 Serizawa Shunsuke, for instance, speaks of sonzaironteki hikikomori (ontological withdrawal). Quoted in 
Allison, supra note 3, p. 74. 
15 Sorensen, supra note 6, p. 101; id. (2007), p. 66 and pp. 78–80; Ito (2007), p. 161; Sorensen, Koizumi, and 
Miyamoto (2008), p. 33; Imada (2010), p. 36. More broadly, see Nakano (2009); Cassegärd (2014); Hirata (2002); 
Scwartz and Pharr (2003); Ogawa (2009); Avenel (2010); id. (2018). 
16 For present purposes, see Sorensen and Funck (2007); Brumann and Schulz (2012); Pekkanen, Tsujinaka, and 
Yamamoto (2014). 
Defining civil society (shimin shakai) is no easy task. This is particularly the case with respect to its Japanese 
variant given that, as Pharr (2003), p. xv, aptly observed, “Japan’s civil society arises in a non-Western context in 
which words such as ‘rights,’ ‘public,’ and even ‘society’ were hard to translate.” An established definition in 
sociological literature, which this article draws from, emphasises the voluntary and associative nature of the 
relations in question. See Warren (2001). 
17 Discussed in this article. 
18 Kikkawa & Shinozaki (2010). 
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been granted legal status under the 1998 Law to Promote Specific Non-profit Activities (1998 
NPO Law).  
While scholars, particularly sociologists and anthropologists, have inquired consistently into 
Japan’s new small-scale, inter-subjective dynamics from diverse perspectives of inquiry,19 
there is a shortage of studies assessing the juridical (and thus, normative) status of their 
formation processes and regulatory regimes.20 This article argues that the paradigm of societal 
constitutionalism developed by Gunther Teubner can be of precious assistance in conducting 
such an appraisal. More specifically, using NAs as case study, it shows that there are instances 
in which such micro-forms of societal relationality and responsibility meet the ‘four quality 
tests’ around which Teubner has developed his analytical framework. Whenever this happens, 
the formation and functioning of NAs can be categorised as self-constitutionalisation processes 
of social sub-areas and function systems in Teubnerian terms.  
Starting from the premise that Eurocentric approaches have dominated the study of Japanese 
culture and society,21 the article fully embraces the situational nature of sociological research. 
In so doing, it further acknowledges that while cross-cultural legal analysis cannot do without 
analytical concepts, 22  there are clear risks in using Western-based conceptualisations for 
analytical evaluations outside the West.23 Further, the article acknowledges the “paradoxical”24 
relationship between comparative law (including its methods) and legal sociology. This 
explains why it offers a contextualisation of Teubner’s reflections on constitutional pluralism 
and diversification of social functions from a peculiar perspective of inquiry regarding Japan’s 
micro-associational landscape: Kiyoshi Hasegawa’s state-centric study of the formation and 
dynamics of NAs as community-based organisations in suburban areas  
                                                          
19 These include the ways in which the natural disasters which, commencing from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power plant’s tsunami of March 2011, devastated Japan’s north-eastern, central, and southern regions have come 
to shed new light on the Japanese polity’s vulnerability and instability. See Kingston (2012); Samuels (2013); 
Mullins & Nakano (2015); Karan & Suganuma (2016). For a comparative survey, see Butt, Nasu, and Luke 
Nottage (2014). See also the (2012) 32 Special Issue of The Journal of Japanese Law on ‘Managing Disasters in 
Japan.’ 
20 An exception is Takamura (2012). 
21 Okano (2017), p. 3. 
22 von Benda-Beckmann (2002), p. 42. 
23 Nelken (1995), p. 437; Chiba (1998). More generally, see Mattei (1997), p. 19; Husa (2015), p. 23. 
24 Cotterrell (2003), p. 131. 
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The reason for choosing NAs as a case study is threefold. First, from a historical point of 
view, NAs are a clear example of the Japanese state’s influence over the development of civil 
society organisations.25 Secondly, although NAs represent a third of the civil society groups in 
Japan and are “the most important organization in most communities,”26 only five per cent of 
them “ha[s] obtained legal status as authorized local area groups.”27 It therefore comes as no 
surprise that NAs have always been considered a fertile field of inquiry regarding the 
emergence, spread, and functioning of “traditional societal norms in Japan” 28  by 
anthropologists and sociologists alike. With respect to socio-legal theory in particular, NAs 
represent the perfect opportunity to (try to) determine whether societal micro-scale groups can 
be granted constitutional character beyond orthodox (i.e. state-based and positivistic) 
categorisations. Finally, and as it will be seen in due course, while such associations are 
primarily formed for coordinating, rather than assistive, purposes, the nature and dynamics of 
their shared cooperative activities as well as of the societal services they provide ultimately 
enhance a sense of purposiveness, community-belonging, responsibility, and “civicness” while 
also feeding back into renewed modes of subjective well-being.  
It should however be clarified that the proposed analysis is not based on the author’s own 
empirical fieldwork. The aim here is not to transplant an analytical framework (i.e. societal 
constitutionalism) from one context to another by relying on appositely selected and elaborated 
data. Rather, the aim is to determine what insights may be gained by juxtaposing the views of 
scholars belonging to different traditions and whose methods of investigation appear to share 
little or nothing. Indeed, and as will be shown, Teubner’s and Hasegawa’s pluralist and state-
centric accounts are incompatible at several levels. However, much may be gained by, first, 
exploring them through the lenses of each other’s methodologies of inquiry and findings; and 
secondly, implementing them with those of other sociologists and political theorists.  In 
suggesting this theoretical endeavour, then, this article represents an exercise in comparative 
                                                          
25 Unfortunately, the scope of this article does not allow to offer a historical introduction to NAs. See Sorensen 
(2006). Cf. Schmidtpott (2012). 
26 Pekkanen, Tsujinaka, and Yamamoto, supra note 16, p. 83. Yet many NAs are inactive and exist only by name. 
See also ibid., 183 about the decrease of participation rates. Cf. Hashimoto (2007).  
27 Ibid., 3. See also ibid., 43–44. 
28 Applbaum (1996), p. 2. 
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legal sociology aimed at assisting scholars in initiating a communal effort from which the 
academic debate on the Japanese’s micro-relational bonds and growing “legal consciousness” 
may ultimately benefit. The adjective “legal” is used broadly as the project proposed here 
requires us to embark upon juridical as well as normative thinking on the ontological 
“whatness” and “howness” of such inter-subjective, humanising phenomena. Such an exercise 
commences by sharing Setsuo Miyazawa’s methodological neo-culturalism—that is to say, the 
belief that the “analysis of encounters and transformations of legal cultures should take a 
bottom-up approach which starts from a micro level.”29 However, in embracing the premise of 
Miyazawa’s contextual method of investigation, it also pushes it farther to transcend the 
boundaries of positivistic approaches to regulatory mechanisms. This move is simply necessary 
if we are to (try to) explore the constitutional character of the inter-subjective phenomena on 
which this article focuses, without neglecting their inner plurality and variable articulations. 
This explains the inter-disciplinary essence of the proposed analysis, which inevitably blends 
together fundamental aspects of political and legal theory, comparative methodology, 
phenomenology, and social ontology—specifically, civic consciousness, engagement, and 
embeddedness; philosophy of shared action and discursive coordination; collective 
intentionality and identity; phenomenology of plurality; biopolitical survival; and ethical 
existentialism.30 
This article is structured as follows. The next Section sets out why Teubner’s societal model 
is preferred over similar accounts, some of which Teubner draws from to frame his analytic. 
Section two introduces the basic thrust of Teubner’s epistemic framework as outlined in his 
major works on the subject. Section three presents Hasegawa’s thought on the formation and 
dynamics of NAs. Taking one step farther, section four engages with some central and 
pervasive themes concerning the proposed comparative analytic. Conclusive remarks follow. 
 
 
 
                                                          
29 Miyazawa (1995), p. 102. 
30 I share Corsi’s (2016), p. 11, view that a sociology of constitutions cannot but be interdisciplinary. 
For the scope of this article, see Benjamin, supra note 1; Benhabib (1992); Beiner (1995); Tuomela (2007); 
Esposito (2013); Dan-Cohen (2016); Durt, Fuchs, and Tewes (2016); Smith (2017); Preyer and Peter (2017). 
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II. Why Teubner (and not Others)? 
 
Two considerations are in order before going any farther. First, it needs to be clarified why the 
suggested comparison uses Teubner’s paradigm instead of one (or more) of the many others 
that have been put forward within the cultural-historical and social organisation traditions. It 
might indeed be objected, with good reason, that other frameworks could be used for our 
comparative analytic—particularly Émile Durkheim’s positivist “organic” solidarity;31 Eugen 
Ehrlich’s customary “living law”; 32  and Niklas Luhmann’s functionalist system theory. 33 
Secondly, it needs to be outlined why, despite the fact that much of his reflections on legal 
pluralism and societal dynamics draw from two thinkers whose accounts are for present 
purposes set aside—namely, Ehrlich and Luhmann34—Teubner’s constitutional sociology is 
worth exploring.  
In regards to the first point, commencing from Durkheim, the emphasis he placed on “those 
social trends which form the basis for solidarity”35 to explain the movement from primitive to 
modern society might certainly sound appealing to assess the Japanese’s micro-relational 
practices of civic friendship and responsibility. However, Durkheim’s anti-subjectivist account 
of social facts36 and view regarding modern law being a reflection of social consciousness 
would not allow us to comprehend the delicate dialectic between Japan’s societal dynamics 
and law’s nature, claims, functioning, and transformative potential. As the number of studies 
which have been conducted about the contemporary developments of Japan’s administrative 
apparatus and the growing “legal consciousness” of the Japanese indicate,37 Japan is not yet 
(and it might never be) a form of polity in which “[l]aw is … the most stable and precise 
                                                          
31 Durkheim (1972); id. (1997), p. 28. 
32 Ehrlich (1916); id. (2002). 
33 Luhmann (2004). 
34 Teubner (1997). 
35 Hassard (1995), p. 15. 
36 Scheppele (2017), p. 36. The term “anti-subjectivist” is not used as a synonymous with “anti-individualist.” See 
Hunt (2013), p. 29. 
37 The literature on this topic is becoming increasingly abundant. With no pretension to exhaustiveness, see e 
Grayd (1984); Upham (1987); id. (2013); Haley (1991); West (2005); Feeley & Miyazawa (2007); id. (2011); 
Foote (2008); Martin & Steel (2008); Ginsburg &. Scheiber (2012); Vanoverbeke et al (2014); Steinhoff (2014); 
Wolff, Nottage, and Anderson (2015). See also The Justice System Reform Council (JSRC), Recommendations 
of the Justice System Reform Council - For a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, (June 12, 
2001). The JSCR was established by Law No 68 of 1999 and its 13 members were all approved by the Diet. 
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element in [the] organization [of social life].”38 If anything, the very emergence and spread of 
the micro-regulatory activities and sectorial interactional episodes this article explores confirm 
not only the presence of a political vacuum at the macro level in Japan (or a space of appearance 
in Arendtian terms), but also that many of the Japanese’s normative expectations continue not 
to find adequate accommodation in law as we are accustomed to consider it.39 This suggests 
the inadequacy for present purposes of Durkheim’s view that “law is to be considered the 
primary form in which society, as a unity, expresses its moral essence, that is the distinctive 
moral character that gives it some kind of integrity and cohesion.”40  
The same argument that leads to dismiss Durkheim’s positivist picture could, however, be 
used to argue for an analytical similarity between Ehrlich’s account of law and customs and 
the Japanese experience.41 I refer to both Ehrlich’s argument that law cannot, and should not, 
be severed from culture and related critique of formalist legal doctrine for its incapacity to 
comprehend why social practices and patterns of behaviour are themselves to be considered as 
a society’s “living law.” Indeed, to Ehrlich, law is (and cannot but be) a social phenomenon in 
the sense that (from a normative, rather than empirical42) law is the expression of an ethnically 
homogenous community’s consciousness, compulsion, and working logic(s) rather than of the 
ruler’s commands, however institutionalised. 43  As a result, social order is neither 
formalistically created nor coercively maintained by state legal institutions, but is rather the 
direct consequence of behavioural conventions and micro-disciplinary dynamics44—a claim 
that Ehrlich substantiates by analysing associations’ spontaneous regulatory mechanisms (i.e. 
                                                          
38 Durkheim (1997), p. 25. 
39 The fact that, in the words of Michael Freeman, “Durkheim has little understanding of legal processes, of how 
law is made, applied, and enforced” represents another reason to depart from his sociology of law. See Freeman 
(2014), p. 712.  
Furthermore, and as it will be seen in Section IV, the adoption Teubner’s societal constitutionalism inevitably 
leads to reconsideration of what is meant by “legal consciousness” in Japan. 
40 Cotterrell (1999), p. 91. 
41 Scholars have already explored this route and arrived at contrasting conclusions. See Rokumoto (1972); Corne, 
supra note 4. 
42 Nelken (2008), p. 445. 
43 There are resemblances of Ehrlich’s argument in a passage of Teubner’s main work on the subject, even though 
Ehrlich is not mentioned. See Teubner (2012), p. 71. 
44 “A social association,” Ehrlich, supra note 32, p. 39, affirms, “is a plurality of human beings who, in their 
relations with one another, recognize certain rules of conduct as binding, and, generally at least, actually regulate 
their conduct according to them.”  
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constitutions) and living law’s interaction with the official law of the state. While an argument 
in favour of using Ehrlich’s pluralist model for our comparison would certainly be sound, it 
ultimately would have to be rejected for two reasons. First, because as noted by David Nelken, 
Ehrlich “moved promiscuously between the different levels of community, organization and 
individual.” 45  Secondly, because as a logical progression, opting for Ehrlich’s would be 
analytically appropriate a posteriori only, i.e. when and if the constitutional quality of the 
micro-relational bonds addressed here is confirmed. But even in that case, Ehrlich’s account 
would have to be dismissed due not only to its structural paradoxes and analytical 
inconsistencies,46 but also to his lack of attention to deviance and sanctions dynamics.47   
This leads us to Luhmann’s system theory of which, as mentioned, Teubner’s self-reflective 
societal constitutionalism is an expression.48 A good reason to rely on Luhmann’s thought for 
our comparative analytic would certainly be the resemblance between his notion of legal 
systems’ operative (i.e. normative) closure49 and Lawrence Freidman’s influential reflections, 
both within and outside the Japanese law literature, on law being a semi-autonomous self-
regulative system. 50  There are, however, two major difficulties with using Luhmann’s 
functionalist theory and method for of our comparison. First, while Luhmann advocated an 
evolutionary and functionalist approach to constitutional norms, his anti-normative sociology 
considered to be misleading to hook our reading of society and its (sub)systems (including law) 
on such concepts as “people” and “human consciousness.”51 According to Luhmann, indeed, 
the development of a truly scientific understanding of society as a system of communications 
requires the drawing of empirically-verifiable theoretical boundaries, and thus, the 
abandonment of ideological illusions as perspectives of inquiry. While such a move is 
justifiable in Luhmann’s case, the research this article promotes asks that such elements are 
taken into account so that new light can be shed on the relationship between law’s content, 
                                                          
45 Nelken, supra note 42, p. 468. 
46 Nimaga (2009), pp. 162–63. 
47 Griffiths (1986), pp. 23–28; Febbrajo (2016), p. 73. 
48 Teubner, supra note 43, p. 105. 
49 Luhmann, supra note 33, pp. 141–72.  
50 Friedman (1975). Cf. King (2013), pp. 70–71. 
51 Luhmann, supra note 33, p. 142. This might also explain why, as recently noted by Hanna (2017), p. 350, “the 
organization of social movements simply did not figure in Luhmann’s research interests.” 
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function, and performance on the one hand, and the “whatness” and “howness” of 
constitutional phenomena on the other. “In the objective content of science,” Ernst Cassirer 
aptly pointed out in his account of human culture, “[the] individual features are forgotten and 
effaced, for one of the principal aims of scientific thought is the elimination of all personal and 
anthropomorphic elements.”52 The inter-disciplinary analysis proposed here – also revolving, 
as set out above, on such topics as shared action, collective intentionality and identity, 
phenomenology of plurality, and ethical existentialism – requires instead that such elements 
are given full consideration.53 The other difficulty is related to the core of Luhmann’s theory, 
i.e. his categorisation of law in functionalist terms. To Luhmann, social systems are defined by 
their specific function. Law is one of such systems and its function is to meet (or stabilise) 
normative expectations.54 This is how, through its binary “legal-illegal” code55 and internal 
sub-systems such as legislative apparatuses and courts,56 (the) law creates and maintains social 
order. While Luhmann’s theory is highly influential, the problem with his functional approach 
for our purposes is that the emergence and diffusion of the micro-relational phenomena under 
consideration here reveal the inability of Japanese law and governance structures 
(Rechtssystem) to perform the stabilising, regulatory instances Luhmann assigns to them. 
Moving on to the second consideration, it needs to be clarified why it is worth asking 
whether Teubner’s societal constitutionalism might assist scholars in developing an analytic of 
the formation and dynamics of the Japanese’s micro-forms of social cohesion and 
responsibility. Without anticipating what will be seen in the following pages, it will suffice to 
say that what makes such an intellectual endeavour worthwhile is the capacity of Teubner’s 
paradigm to decode the juridical and normative force of current (sub)modes of organisational 
proliferation and functional differentiation.  
                                                          
52 Cassirer (1944), p. 228. 
53 Further, it should be noted that history has already proved the limits of positivist reason in sociological analysis. 
See Hughes (1977). 
54 Luhmann supra note 33, pp. 142–72. 
55 Ibid., 122–31. 
56 Ibid., 274–304. But see King & Thornhill (2003), p. 35. 
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As Teubner duly notes, the American sociologist David Sciulli was the first one, in the early 
1990s,57 to “develop a refined theory of societal constitutionalism.”58 Sciulli’s concept has 
been increasingly used in recent years to analytically assess all those pluralist configurations 
of private orderings that challenge the Westphalian model of the modern state as an 
authoritarian construct that exercises exclusive sovereign powers over a given territory and 
people. Drawing from, as well as transcending, well-established categorisations within 
sociological discourse, Teubner makes specific use of Sciulli’s paradigm to uncover the 
constitutional status of autonomous sites of rule-production and enforcement which transcend 
conventional boundaries and background assumptions of classic constitutional theory—such 
as, for instance, the “public-private” divide and the “state-and-politics centricity” which inform 
modern constitutionalism. 59  Teubner does so by also pushing one step farther Reinhart 
Koselleck’s attempt at “liber[ating] constitutionalism from its limitation to the state and to 
extend it to all institutions of society.”60 The purpose of Teubner’s pluralist constitutional 
sociology is indeed to set out and legitimise the formation and normative working logic(s) of 
contemporary social sub-systems by overcoming some of the basic difficulties of modern 
constitutionalism. This, in turn, helps legal theories and practitioners solve some of the 
longstanding constitutional issues surrounding the increasing relevance of fast-evolving 
processes of diversification and fragmentation that shape the uncertain and liquid normative 
architecture of our time and challenge the rigid “national/international” dialect.  
Some commentators might at this point object that Teubner’s pluralist theory is primarily 
aimed at meeting the challenges facing national constitutions in the context of globalisation 
and transnationalism. As a logical progression, the argument would conclude that it would be 
analytically inappropriate to tie Teubner’s reflections to the societal dynamics of a national 
polity like Japan. While sound, this argument ought to be rejected for two reasons. First, it 
misses the structural role that the development of the so-called transnational civil society has 
played in the formation and spread of civil society instances in Japan.61 Secondly, it obfuscates 
                                                          
57 Sciulli (1992). 
58 Teubner (2017), p. 316. 
59 Teubner (2008); id supra note 43, p. 3. 
60 Teubner supra note 43, p. 16. 
61 Yamamoto (1999); Imada (2010), pp. 34–7. 
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the fact that Teubner’s analysis covers the pluralisation of regulative sources and norm-setting 
bodies, as well as the systemic diffusion and penetration of regime shifting mechanisms not 
only at the macro and meso, but also at the micro levels. And indeed, in arguing that societal 
constitutionalism predates globalisation,62 Teubner has not failed to grasp the relevance of 
micro-social dynamics and functional differentiation processes to substantiate his analytic of 
constitutionalisation phenomena.63  
 
 
III. Teubner’s Constitutional Pluralism 
 
As recently set out by Paul Blokker, “[t]he sociological analysis of constitutions and 
constitutionalism is, in important respects, concerned with the analysis of the emergence of 
constitutional structures outside of the formal political realm of the nation state.” 64  A 
protagonist in this field, Teubner has over the years developed “one of the most highly evolved 
positions in the contemporary sociology of law and legal-political norms.”65 Its premise is that 
today’s globalisation “is a highly contradictory and highly fragmented process in which politics 
has lost its leading role.”66 This “multi-placed scenario” not only vindicates Ehrlich’s “opinion 
that a centrally produced political law is marginal compared with the lawyers’ law in practical 
decision-making and especially with the living law of the Bukowina.”67 Above all, it indicates 
that “positivist theories of law which stress the unity of state and law as well as . . . critical 
theories which tend to dissolve law into power politics”68 are inadequate to decipher the legal 
character of contemporary global and transnational regulatory dynamics.69 Thus lawyers have 
to look elsewhere if they are to efficiently navigate through the theoretical malleability and 
practical complexities that contradistinguish pluralist regulative phenomena beyond the state. 
                                                          
62 Teubner (2010), pp. 329–34. 
63 Teubner, supra note 43, pp. 1–2, p. 6, pp. 15–41, p. 60, and p. 65. 
64 Blokker (2017), p. 178. 
65 Thornhill (2011), p. 244. 
66 Teubner, supra note 34, p. 3. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. See also Teubner, supra note 43, p. 61 and p. 74; id. (2013), p. 54. 
69  It is worth noticing that Teubner is amongst those commentators that use the terms “globalisation,” 
“transnationalism,” “global law,” and “transnational law” in such a way as to highlight what unites them. See 
Teubner supra note 34; id. (2015), p. 248; Teubner and Korth (2012), pp. 23–54. 
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In particular, they should start exploring the “social source of global law,”70 which Teubner 
identifies with “the proto-law of specialized, organisational and functional networks which are 
forming a global, but sharply limited, identity.”71  This “new living law,” Teubner maintains, 
“is nourished . . . from the ongoing self-production of highly technical highly specialized, often 
formally organized and rather narrowly defined, global networks of an economic, cultural, 
academic or technological nature.”72  
Global and transnational law’s peculiar content and functioning force therefore require 
interpreters and practitioners to abandon conventional (i.e. state-centric) assumptions regarding 
not only law’s formation and functioning broadly understood, but also regarding the political 
essence of constitutional development. In particular, it does so to an extent by which it “poses 
not just regulatory questions, but also constitutional problems in the strict sense.”73 Among 
these stand “the question of the fundamental constitution of social dynamics.” 74  Such 
ontological interrogative, Teubner notes, is brought about by the “new constitutional reality” 
to the extent that this “is characterized by the co-existence of independent orders, not only of 
states, but at the same time also of autonomous non-state social structures.”75 These “islands 
of the constitutional”76 are, in fact, actual “[c]onstitutional norms [which] are developed ad hoc 
when a current conflict assumes constitutional dimensions and requires constitutional 
decisions.”77 
Thus the need for a constitutional sociology capable of “overcom[ing] the obstinate state-
and-politics-centricity”78 and answering the “new constitutional question”79 prompted by the 
fast growing emergence and spread (and thus, constitution) of pluralist regulatory activities and 
modes of legalisation that transcend state-based categorisations. A need that constitutional 
lawyers simply dismiss while arguing that “[t]he so-called constitutions beyond the state . . .  
                                                          
70 Teubner, supra note 34, p. 5. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Teubner, supra note 43, p. 1. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., 52. 
76 Ibid., 51. 
77 Ibid., 52. 
78 Ibid., 3. 
79 Ibid., 1. 
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lack a social substrate that could provide a suitable object for a constitution.”80 What is rejected, 
in particular, is the fact that “globalization produces a tension between the self-foundation of 
autonomous global social systems and their political-legal constitutionalization.”81 What a 
closer, non-doctrinal but socially-grounded observation would reveal, however, is that “in the 
discrepancy between globally established social subsystems and a politics stuck at inter-state 
level, the constitutional totality breaks apart and can then only be replaced by a form of 
constitutional fragmentation.”82 
This is where Teubner moves away from what he labels the “basic deficiency of modern 
constitutionalism” 83  and deploys his self-reflective societal model which operationalises 
pluralist regulatory practices, arrangements, and instruments in constitutional terms by 
blending together fundamental aspects of Sciulli’s societal constitutionalism and Luhmannian 
structural coupling.84 At the centre of Teubner’s move lies a series of substantive as well as 
methodological considerations. First, Teubner notes, the constitution is both essentially and 
existentially the result of communicative, conflicting, and self-defining social practices rather 
than of formal political-legal processes of legitimation and validation. Thus we read that “the 
constitution is too important to be left to constitutional lawyers and political philosophers 
alone.”85 What a constructivist reading of the constitutional moment would miss—and this is 
the second consideration—is that the “the constitution in the first instances serves to enable the 
self-foundation of a social system.”86 The self-reflective constituting process ought therefore 
to be decoded both in societal and functionalist terms, i.e. as an autopoietic mechanism aimed 
at self-establishing and self-organising social spheres. Not coincidentally, when elaborating on 
this passage, Teubner quotes Luhmann, according to whom “every function system defines its 
own identity for itself . . .  through an elaborated semantics of self-ascription of meaning, of 
                                                          
80 Ibid., 59. 
81 Ibid., 43. 
82 Ibid., 51. 
83 Ibid., 3. 
84 As Teubner (2014), p. 235, himself affirmed when calling for a “distanced” encounter between law and social 
theory, “[t]here is no single social theory upon which the law could orient itself.”  
85 Ibid., 3. See also ibid., 59; id. (2013), p. 46. 
86 Ibid., 103. 
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reflection, of autonomy.” 87  However, at the same time Teubner makes it clear that a 
phenomenological analytic of societal constitutions would confirm that 
 
[t]he comprehensive structural coupling of politics and law, observed by Luhmann 
in the constitutions of nation states, clearly has no equivalent at the level of world 
society. At the same time, occasional couplings can be seen as and when social 
problems demand. Constitutional norms are developed ad hoc when a current 
conflict assumes constitutional dimensions and requires constitutional decisions.88  
 
This is a key-passage in Teubner’s theory to the extent that, he observes, national law can “no 
longer externalis[e] its paradoxes to politics, but diverts it to other social systems [by] look[ing] 
for a different constitutional foundation of its norm production.” Thus, “[i]f it is no longer the 
state constitution that is enlisted for externalising paradoxes, but the constitutions of social 
subsectors, so of the economy, the media, science and healthcare, then there are immediate, 
tangible consequences.” 89  This can only be grasped, however, if constituent power is 
realistically and efficiently re-thought “as a communicative potential, a type of social energy.”90 
Understanding constitutional power in this way allows interpreter (finally) to comprehend how 
the self-reflective process witness at the national level is being replaced by a multitude of 
(inherently pluralistic 91 ) self-reflective constitutional instances amongst the various sub-
orderings of society. Thus Teubner writes: 
 
[c]onstitutions deal with the paradoxes of self-reference practically by 
externalizing them to the surrounding context. Social systems are never entirely 
autonomous: there are always points of heteronomy. If this externalization now 
occurs with the help of constitutions, the moment of heteronomy comes when the 
social system refers to the law. The ‘self’ of the social system is defined 
heteronomously by legal norms and it can then define itself autonomously thereby. 
While the unity of a social system develops through the concatenation of its own 
operations, its identity is created in its constitution through the re-entry of external 
legal descriptions into its own self-description.92 
 
                                                          
87 Teubner (2011), p. 14, quoting Luhmann. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Teubner (2016), p. 33. See also id. supra note 43, p. 75. 
90 Teubner supra note 43, 62. Emphasis in original. 
91  “Societal constitutionalism,” Teubner (2016), p. 41, asserts, “paints a picture of constitutional pluralism, 
although one that is anything but uniform, since it realises different degrees of intensity of constitutionalisation.” 
92 Teubner supra note 43, p. 65. 
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Hence the core of Teubner’s constitutional theory, according to which 
 
the constitutional moment refers to the immediate experience of crisis, the 
experience that an energy released in society is bringing about destructive 
consequences, the experience that can be overcome only by a process of self-
critical reflection and a decision to engage in self-restraint.93 
 
From this it follows that the self-structuring of societal constitutions inevitably requires to take 
into account what would happen when the sub-system’s “growth-energies”94 accelerate “to the 
point where it tips over into destructiveness by colliding with other social dynamics.”95 It is at 
the verge of these “moments of catastrophe”96 that constitutional rules emerge to limit the 
system’s “excessive growth process.”97 However, the response to this excess of signification 
takes the form of an autopoietic, self-immunising reaction as “it is only possible to invent these 
limitations from within the system-specific logic, and not from the outside.” 98  External 
pressures are, then, internalised through structural coupling—i.e. they are absorbed by the 
function system so that its “internal limitations are configured and become truly effective.”99 
These dynamics explain why, despite the fact that they inevitably transcend the rigid 
parameters imposed by modern constitutionalism on intellectual configurations, societal 
constitutions are able to exert those constitutive and limitative functions proper of national 
constitutions. This aspect is further developed by Teubner through an analysis of the role 
played, in each function system, by what he defines as the “organized-professional sphere,” the 
“spontaneous sphere,” and various “collegial institutions”100 which are “responsible for the 
self-regulation of the communicative media—power, money, law, and truth.”101  
                                                          
93 Ibid., 82. 
94 Teubner supra note 87, p. 12. 
95 Ibid., 10. 
96 Ibid., 12. 
97 Ibid., 13. 
98 Ibid., 14. 
99 Ibid., 13. 
100 Teubner supra note 43, p. 101. 
101 Ibid., 89–96. See also ibid., 101:  
 
[c]ollegial institutions are reflexive bodies aimed at social self-identification in two senses: they 
establish the specific rationality and normativity of the social sphere and they seek to make them 
compatible with their environments. The collegial institutions function as a kind of think-tank for 
the sub-constitution, which for its part governs the ecological relations of the social system.   
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This conceptualisation is taken up again later on, when we read that “[s]ocietal 
constitutionalism opposes the centralization of fundamental socio-political issues in the 
political system. Its concern is to multiply the sites where controversies are fought and 
decisions are made about the ‘political’ in society.”102 Critically, it should be noted that none 
of this would be possible without the actively decisive “consciousness and corporeality of 
actual people.” 103  It is indeed this anthropological element of “inter-subjectivity,” 104  as 
Teubner calls it, that “triggers the pouvoir constituant, the potential, the capacity, the energy, 
indeed the power of self-constitutionalization: the reciprocal irritations between society and 
individuals, between communication and consciousness.”105 This anti-Lehumanniean aspect of 
Teubner’s theory is of pivotal importance for the healthy development of the inter-disciplinary 
research proposed here. This is so despite the fact that right after having so claimed, Teubner 
returns to Luhmann and clarifies that “there is no uniform shared meaning, no merging of 
horizons between the minds involved, but rather a series of separate but intersecting 
consciousness and communication processes.”106 
This reconstruction of the constitutional paradox poses, however, a “fundamental 
problem”107 regarding the self-limiting autonomy and identity of independent orders for which 
Teubner’s societal constitutionalism aims to offer a solution: “How is it possible,” Teubner 
asks, to increase external pressure in order to stem the negative externalities of autonomous 
subsystems by means of their internal self-limitation?”108  As can be easily guessed, this 
interrogative hides, in fact, a meta-ontological question concerning the very method through 
which Teubner draws and promotes his societal picture—an interrogative that, as will be seen 
below, his critics did not fail to pose. Teubner is, of course, aware of this and from the very 
beginning of Constitutional Fragments clarifies that his sociological constitutionalism 
 
                                                          
 
102 Ibid., 121. 
103 Ibid., 63. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
106 Ibid. Thus transnational constitutions can do without representative democracy.  See Teubner (2018) 
107 Ibid., 41. 
108 Ibid. 
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is based on four different variants of sociological theory. Primarily, it draws on 
general theories of social differentiation that move the internal constitutions of 
social subsystems to the centre of attention. It is also based on the newly established 
constitutional sociology, further, on the theory of private government and, finally, 
on the concept of societal constitutionalism.109 
 
Further, “[c]onstitutional sociology . . . promises to link historical and empirical analyses of 
the constitutional phenomenon with normative perspectives.”110 And indeed, while traditional 
constitutionalism finds no accommodation within this new societal framework, Teubner 
reassures us that “[i]n empirical and in normative terms, there are lessons to be learnt from the 
rich history of nation-state constitutions.” 111  Importantly, while Teubner concedes that 
“[c]onstitutional sociology can by no means predetermine legal principles, not to mention 
individual constitutional rules,”112 his theory cannot avoid “modify[ing] the prerequisites for 
constitutional substrates.”113 It does so by contending that  
 
[f]irstly, the constitution should be disconnected from statehood, so that 
transnational issue-specific regulatory regimes may be considered candidates for 
constitutionalization. Secondly, the constitution should be decoupled from 
institutionalized politics, thus allowing other areas of global civil society to be 
identified as possible constitutional subjects. Thirdly, the constitution should be 
decoupled from the medium of power, thus making other media of communication 
possible constitutional targets.114  
 
This multi-faced, intellectual turn revolves around two rather controversial steps which 
accommodate constitutional law’s sociological necessity to “concentrate on developing 
limitative rules for transnational regimes”115  and “develo[p] constitutional rules that are in a 
position to respond to the motivation-competence dilemma that transnational regimes are 
facing.”116 These steps are: an empirically-grounded re-elaboration of such notions as the 
afore-mentioned pouvoir constituent-constitué, the constitutional subject, and collective 
                                                          
109 Ibid., 3. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid., 60. 
112 Teubner (2013), p. 56. 
113 Teubner, supra note 43, p. 60. 
114 Ibid., 60. 
115 Teubner (2013), p. 57. Emphasis in original. 
116 Ibid. 
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identity; and an equally empirically-grounded re-elaboration of the “juridification-
constitutionalisation” dichotomy.117  
According to Teubner, the suggested roadmap allows us to reorient constitutional language 
beyond the narrow perimeter of orthodox (i.e. state-based) configurations so that self-limiting 
societal regulatory practices may be granted constitutional character. Both passages serve 
Teubner to, first, detach the decoding of the foundational dynamics and working logics of 
intermediary groups, social sub-areas, and functional orderings from the formalist reading of 
modern constitutional theories centred around state-formation processes; and secondly, 
preserve the constitution as a conceptual construct. And indeed, Teubner notes, “[a]lternative 
terms, such as ‘meta-regulation’, ‘indispensable norms’, or ‘higher legal principles’ are 
inadequate to comprehend the complexity of issues that the concept ‘constitution’ covers.”118 
Rather, what is required is a complete reconceptualization of the constitution as “a living 
process, the self-identification of a social system with the assistance of the law.”119 As Teubner 
clarifies a little later when setting out why “transnational constitutionalism goes far beyond a 
mere juridification of societal sphere”120: 
 
[s]ocietal constitutions are . . . defined as structural coupling between the reflexive 
mechanisms of the law (that is, secondary legal norm creation in which norms are 
applied to norms) and the reflexive mechanisms of the social sector concerned.121 
 
Under this new effectual, yet “irritating,”122 light, 
 
[t]he norms of a transnational regime will have to pass the following quality tests 
in order to count as constitutional norms: 
(1) Constitutional functions: do transnational regimes produce legal norms that 
perform more than merely regulatory or conflict solving functions, ie act as either 
‘constitutive rules’ or ‘limitative rules’ in the strict sense? 
(2) Constitutional arenas: is it possible to identify different arenas of 
constitutionalization—comparable to the arenas of organized political processes 
                                                          
117 Teubner supra note 43, p. 16, p. 18, p. 73, p. 79, and p. 105. 
118 Ibid., 60.  
119 Ibid., 71. 
120 Ibid., 102. 
121 Ibid., 105. 
122 Teubner, supra note 43, p. 15; id. (2013). 
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and the spontaneous process of public opinion, as they are regulated in the 
organizational part of state constitutions? 
(3) Constitutional processes: do the legal norms of the regimes develop a 
sufficiently close connection to their social context or their ‘nomic community’—
comparable to that between constitutional norms and the ‘nomic community’ of 
nation states? 
(4) Constitutional structures: do the regimes form typical constitutional structures 
as they are known in nation states, in particular the familiar superiority of 
constitutional rules and judicial review of ordinary law?123 
 
The argument pursued by this article is that these “quality tests” regarding the emergence and 
dynamics of (de-formalised) sectorial constitutions may assist scholars in assessing the 
analytical register of the formation, organisational structure, and regulatory mechanisms of 
NAs as micro-relational arenas of civic friendship, solidarity, and responsibility. More 
particularly, and as mentioned earlier, it submits that much may be gained by contextualising 
Teubner’s societal constitutionalism through the lens of Hasegawa’s scholarship on the 
formation and dynamics of NAs as community-based organisations and network systems in 
suburban areas—to be explored in the next Section. 
 
 
IV. Hasegawa’s State-centric Account 
 
Hasegawa is a leading legal sociologist and comparatist whose scholarship explores the role 
that state law and informal, pluralist arrangements play in the formation and development of 
micro-scale communities in suburban areas. Hasegawa’s socio-legal studies focus on the 
relationship between communities’ purposive actions, social normativity, and law’s 
instrumentality. In terms of methodology, his accounts share some affinity with the so-called 
“mobile method” of empirical research 124  on pluralist orderings and shared cooperative 
activities. Hasegawa’s aim is indeed to decode the way in which the regulatory dynamics of 
micro-relational bonds help mould a sense of civic embeddedness, collective solidarity and 
responsibility, and mutual understanding. This is a theme that Hasegawa investigates not only 
from the standpoint of Kawashima’s seminal reflections on the Japanese’s “legal 
                                                          
123 Ibid., 74–5. See also id. (2013), pp. 54–6. 
124 Büscher & Urry (2009). 
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consciousness,” mentioned earlier, but by also drawing from such Western political theorists, 
sociologists, and lawyers as Tocqueville, Ehrlich, Giddens, Luhmann, Galanter, Hart, and 
Teubner.  
For the purposes of our discussion, attention should be paid to Hasegawa’s state-centric 
reflections on the regulatory functions of NAs as set out in his Japanese monograph on the 
subject125 and in a more recent article which is aimed at re-contextualising his main findings 
for the English-speaking readership. 126  Hasegawa describes such community-based 
organisations as “nonlegal, unincorporated voluntary associations [which] are created neither 
by statutes nor contracts but on a voluntary basis.”127 Hasegawa’s intention with this definition 
is to emphasise how the nature and functions exerted by such voluntary groups do not fall 
within the purview of state-based configurations and constructs, including law. That this 
categorisation is underpinned by the public-private law dialectic clearly emerges a little later, 
when Hasegawa reiterates that “NAs are a kind of nonlegal social relationships” 128  and 
specifies that he categorises “social relationships that are prescribed by any existing express 
legislative enactments as legal relationships, while those that are not prescribed are nonlegal 
ones.”129 
While merely introductory, these definitions are of pivotal relevance for our purposes as 
they reveal the state-based (i.e. positivistic) substratum of Hasegawa’s method of inquiry. 
Importantly, the voluntary, and thus, not properly legal, nature of NAs has been stressed by 
other commentators as well. In a seminal work on the subject, for instance, Robert J. Pekkanen 
has similarly described NAs as “voluntary groups whose membership is drawn from a small, 
geographically delimited, and exclusive residential area (a neighbourhood).” 130  These 
categorisations are rooted in the 2005 Supreme Court ruling where it was held that participation 
                                                          
125 Hasegawa (2005). 
126 Hasegawa (2009). 
127 Ibid., 80. Emphasis in original. 
128 Ibid., 84. Emphasis added. 
129 Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
130 Pekkanen (2006), p. 87. 
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in NAs is not compulsory.131 Yet, it should be noted that membership has never represented a 
problem as it is maintained by household. Thus Yutaka Tsujinaka, Hidehiro Yamamoto and 
Pekkeanen observe that “Japanese NHAs have more members than almost any other civil 
society in the world.”132 This is also due to the fact that, despite their voluntary nature, NAs 
can exert considerable social pressure on those householders who do not take part in them133 
or who, after having joined, do not contribute financially or actively engage.134  
With respect to the services which NAs provide, in an early study, Applbaum noted that 
these “can be classed into three areas: environmental, social (including spiritual), and 
political.”135 Writing two decades later, Pekkanen tells us that their “activities are multiple and 
centered”136 in the local area of interest. Further, after having suggested that NAs “can be 
characterized by the ‘four smalls’: they have small membership, small numbers of professional 
staff, and small budgets and operate on a small local area,” 137  Pekkanen observes that 
“[t]hrough this organizational form alone Japan exhibits a remarkable vital local civil 
society.”138 Pekkanen’s broad definition may be combined with what Tsujinaka, Yamamoto 
and Pekkeanen maintained a few years later—namely, that NAs’ “activities include local 
environment, social events among the residents, safety and welfare activities, cooperation with 
local government through disseminating information among residents, and articulation of local 
demands to government.”139 An analogous statement may be found in Hasegawa’s account, 
where we read that: 
 
NAs usually hold various functions and establish a system of mutual assistance. 
For example, they organize social gatherings and community festivals among the 
residents; enable recreation, crime-and-fire prevention and garbage collection; 
                                                          
131 Supreme Court of Japan, April 26 2005, Claim for Membership fee of Jichikai (Case Number: (Ju) 1742), 216 
Shumin, 639, available at <http://www.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_jp/595/062595_hanrei.pdf> accessed June 
16 2018. 
132 Pekkanen, Tsujinaka, and Yamamoto, supra note 16, p. 63. 
133 Cf. Applbaum, supra note 28, pp. 13–5 and pp. 22–6. 
134 Hasegawa, supra note 126, p. 80. 
135 Applbaum, supra note 28, p. 2. 
136 Pekkanen, supra note 130, p. 87. Surprisingly enough, Pekkanen’s work is note cited in Hasegawa’s paper. 
137 Ibid., 27. 
138 Ibid., 32. 
139 Pekkanen, Tsujinaka, and Yamamoto supra note 16, p. 2. 
ACCEPTED DRAFT:  
  
Luca Siliquini-Cinelli 
 
‘Societal Constitutionalism in Japan: 
Neighbourhood Associations as Micro-relational Constitutional Sites’ 
 
ASIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, 2019 
 
24 
 
ensure that the neighborhood is clean and serve as information channels for the 
happenings in the city and as vote-gathering machines in their constituencies. 
In short, NAs have quasi-public characteristics because they provide local public 
services.140 
 
It is against this broadly defined, functional description that Hasegawa aims to assess the 
peculiar role that NAs play in enhancing and regulating societal interaction and resolving 
small-scale disputes in suburban areas which are either regulated by building agreements (BAs) 
or not. Yet, it should be mentioned that Hasegawa’s micro-sociological research only indirectly 
touches on some of the themes at the centre of this article regarding human sociability and 
reciprocal altruism. I refer to such aspects as NAs’ ability to satisfy participants’, and thus, 
communities’ existential needs by correcting societal marginalisation and improving their well-
being. As such, Hasegawa’s analysis cannot directly assist us in unfolding the societal role that 
NAs play in shaping what for our purposes may be defined as cultural evolution of micro-scale 
sociality and group responsibility. Hence in the next Section his findings will be complemented 
with those of other sociologists and anthropologists who have problematised the contextual 
nature of relational phenomena from this perspective of inquiry as well. 
Hasegawa commences his considerations by noting that “[w]hen BAs are created or 
enforced, NAs often provide resources such as money, manpower and meeting places, though 
they have no legal relation to BAs.”141 Further, Hasegawa maintains that “NAs draw up rules 
containing quasi-regulations that resemble those of the BAs in their neighborhoods. They also 
impose various social sanctions on those who violate these quasi-regulations and urge them to 
stop or modify their construction by referring to them.”142   
After having so clarified, Hasegawa moves on to setting out as well as commenting on seven 
case studies, two of which are of particular interest to us as they involve disputes outside BAs 
areas, and thus, institutionalised regulatory arrangements. This empirically-grounded analysis 
constitutes the core of Hasegawa’s study as it serves him to prove that despite being, as he calls 
                                                          
140 Hasegawa supra note 126) 80. 
141 ibid., 82. 
142 ibid. 
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them, non-legal relationships, occasionally “NAs are . . . appropriated for the use of other legal 
relationships.”143  
This passage is of the essence to grasp the core of Hasegawa’s findings regarding the extra-
legal nature, as he labels it, of the services which NAs provide. Indeed, commenting on the 
first of the two case studies which do not involve BAs, Hasegawa writes: 
 
even those who do not join the BA are often members of the NAs. Therefore, they 
are bound by the rules or decisions of the NAs. Sometimes, these rules include not 
only moral codes or etiquette but also quasi-regulations that resemble the 
regulations of the BAs. Although some rules are private contracts between 
residents, others are not, either because not all residents agree to the rules or not all 
the regulations can be legally enforced. However, though the residents often know 
that the latter are not legally binding, they obey them out of necessity. We can call 
rules in the NAs that are not legally binding nonlegal rules.144 
 
The case concerned the construction of a building whose dimensions, it turned out, did not 
comply with the requirements set out by the local BA. Before purchasing the land, the 
constructor had been assured that a BA would not be created, yet one was eventually formed 
which resembled old-established NA rules concerning land-use and building dimensions. 
Because the constructor did not join the BA, the relevant homeowners association suggested a 
“compromise solution”145  which, after a long negotiation, led to a settlement. What is of 
interest here is that all of this was done outside the institutional purview of the BA, into which 
the constructor had not entered. Thus, the parties had to resort to the NA’s (non-legal, according 
to Hasegawa) rules for solving their dispute. Drawing from Hart, Gouldner, and Luhmann, 
Hasegawa concludes that  
 
[i]n modern society, legal relations are not reciprocal ones that need local 
compensatory arrangements such as noblesse oblige or mutual concessions, but 
complementary ones in which such arrangements are not needed. Therefore, when 
the residents cannot rely on the legal relations based on the BA, they have only 
reciprocal relations based on the NA to rely on.146 
 
                                                          
143 ibid., 84. 
144 ibid., 92. Emphasis added. 
145 ibid., 93. 
146 ibid. 
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The second dispute concerned the construction of 26 single-family houses on a retarding basing 
whose area was not covered by the local BA. According to the latter, the lots could only be 
sub-divided if they met specific requirements which, according to pre-construction planning, 
they did not. While the BA could not apply, the NA had previously stated that “land use of lots 
outside or near the BA area is also bound by the BA.”147 The issue therefore arose as to whether 
the BA could be indirectly enforced via reference to the NA’s regulatory regime. After 
extended negotiations, the developer agreed to most of the requests made by the NA’s board 
to prevent the construction works being delayed. In his observations on the case, Hasegawa 
explains that “although [the developer] was an outsider, the board could not strongly oppose 
[him] since the rules of the NA were nonlegal. However, these rules showed the solidarity of 
this community.”148 
In his conclusive remarks, Hasegawa further reflects on his findings and notes, amongst 
other things, the following: 
 
a) In the BA areas, residents took legal rules into account when facing conflicts 
concerning BAs. It is true that, in most cases, they settled their disputes through 
compromises or negotiations out of court. However, they recognized their rights, 
observed their disputes from a legal point of view and referred to the legal rules.149 
 
b) When residents discussed and settled their disputes concerning the BAs, NAs 
played important roles. Although NAs are nonlegal associations, they often act as 
a seedbed for legal associations (e.g. HOAs). NAs often supported HOAs by 
providing them with resources and imposing social sanctions on deviants . . . The 
social network of the NAs was ‘appropriated’ by the residents who utilized the 
legal system. In the neighborhood, there was a dualistic social structure that 
consisted of the HOAs and the NAs. Both often worked together.150 
 
c) In the neighborhood, the residents occasionally referred to and utilized not only 
legal rules but also nonlegal rules such as the residential rules of the NAs. The 
residents often recognized the difference between legal and nonlegal rules and were 
also aware of their limitations. This is why the board had to refer to the nonlegal 
                                                          
147 ibid., 94. 
148 ibid. Emphasis added. 
149 ibid., 95. 
150 ibid. Emphasis added. 
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rules of the NA . . . and dissuade the residents from pressing unreasonable demands 
on the developer.151 
 
Thus, referring to Giddens and Teubner, Hasegawa concludes that NAs represent “a good 
example of the intersection of intimacy and impersonality.”152 This is also because “residents 
have . . . developed their sense of ‘reflexive monitoring’ of the diverse social rules.”153 
As the next section will show, Hasegawa’s state-centric arguments regarding what is 
considered to be properly “legal” in Japan as well as his reflections on NAs’ capacity to mould 
a relational sense of responsibility and community-belonging have far-reaching consequences 
for our comparative analysis. Before turning to that, however, it should be noted that the impact 
of Hasegawa’s contentions can be better appreciated if contextualised against what Yu Ishida 
and Naoko Okuyama have recently affirmed in an essay which explores how “private-led 
prosocial commitments to local community welfare” 154  are supported by non-member 
donations. As Ishida and Okuyama observe, indeed, NAs (NHAs in their essay) “[h]ave 
evolved five structural and organisational distinctions as their central features over time.”155 
More particularly: 
 
(1) the NHAs have their own local areas for administration and activities, and one’s 
local areas do not overlap with another; (2) the unit of account for the NHA 
members is a household, not an individual; (3) all the households in an area by 
default are members of the respective NHA; (4) the NHAs comprehensively assess 
a broad variety of local community issues; and (5) the NHAs are then the 
representative organizations to the local municipalities and outsider authorities.156 
 
As discussed, the interrogative posed by this article is whether the formation, nature, 
organisational structure, and regulatory functions exerted by NAs fully meet Teubner’s afore-
mentioned four quality tests. Answering this interrogative inevitably requires also an 
                                                          
151 ibid. Emphasis added. 
152 ibid., 96 
153 ibid. 
154 Yu Ishida and Naoko Okuyama, ‘Local Charitable Giving and Civil Society Organizations in Japan’ (2015) 
26(4) Voluntas 1164–88, at 1166. 
155 ibid., 1167. 
156 ibid., 1167–68. 
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engagement with some of the criticism which has been raised against Teubner’s pluralist 
model. Both aspects are discussed in the following section. 
 
 
V. Some Reflections 
 
A. Law and the Micro-relational Politics of Sociality 
 
Modern society is highly functionally differentiated. Japan is, of course, no exception. It was 
after the Great Hanshin earthquake of 1995, however, that scholars commenced                                                                                                                                     
paying increasing attention to the growth and spread of multi-dimensional forms of civic 
engagement and responsibility in Japan. It is seems now clear that a fundamental role in the 
development of micro-scale participatory dynamics was played by a series of international and 
transnational factors that helped contain the impact of those state policies aimed at constraining 
the emergence of non-governmental organisations.157  Further, it is equally accepted that while 
the Japanese state is generally opposed to “the formation of national movements that are local 
in origin,”158 “[o]ver the [past] thirty years, citizen participation in planning decisions increased 
and local planning authorities gained power.”159 Not coincidentally, the 1998 NPO law arose 
out of the Japanese state’s awareness regarding its lack of local knowledge and inability to 
provide mass-disaster relief. While scholars are divided on such matters as the trajectories and 
effects of this political turn160 and the involvement of local governments in urban planning 
activities, they tend to agree that 
 
[c]ivil society in Japan is expanding and becoming more pluralistic, gradually 
moving away from the predominance of business associations typical of a 
developmental state . . . Japanese society as a whole is moving from a security-
based society in which individuals pursue cautious, commitment-forming 
                                                          
157 Kim D. Reimann, Rise of Japanese NGOs: Activism from Above (Routledge 2010). 
158 Hein & Pelletier (2006),164–81, at 165. 
159 Ishida supra note 4, at 25. 
160 Pekkanen supra note 130). According to Ogawa, supra note 15, p. 184 and p. 180, what the 1998 NPO law has 
led to is civil society’s “failure.” The reason, Ogawa maintains, is that the new legislation reinforces the state’s 
presence through “performance targets or cost cutting in public administration and the growth of managerialism 
by the government as a mode of collaboration with the NPO.” See also Evans (2002). More generally, see 
Sorensen and Funck (2007). 
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strategies to a trust-based society in which individuals purse more open, 
opportunity-seeking strategies.161 
 
Furthermore, as Ishida and Okuyama have more recently noted, “[t]hese days more people in 
Japan have become more concerned about the development of their local society and 
community, and have tried to involve others towards achieving sustainable development.”162 
This, in turn, helps reverse the Japanese’s ontological withdrawal and social marginalisation 
by enhancing a sense of purposiveness, community-belonging, reciprocity, solidarity, 
responsibility, and civicness. “The principal social function of the jichikai,” Applbaum 
observed in the middle of Japan’s first lost decade, “is to integrate residents and promote a 
sense of solidarity in the neighbourhood.”163 A little later, Applbaum further asserted that NAs 
are “a constant fact and reminder of obligations to neighbourhood life.”164 Hasegawa’s case 
studies, particularly the second one, as well as other recent accounts confirm this. And indeed, 
NAs’ “meetings are general fora in which . . . members are permitted and even encouraged to 
participate.”165  It is no coincidence that, amongst the many social services NAs provide, 
“friendships and social gatherings among residents”166 play a key-role. It is unsurprising, then, 
that “in their provision of social services, NAs are generally guided by their intimate knowledge 
of local conditions and a close connection to the people being served (the neighbors).”167 
This view is reinforced by the contextual nature of NA’s modes of governance as well as by 
their collaborative working relationships with other local organisations and Social Welfare 
Councils.168 It is further confirmed by all those activities which NAs undertake to foster social 
capital, bonding, and participation,169 while also enhancing a sense of political representation 
and accountability.170 Tsujinaka, Yamamoto and Pekkeanen observe that NAs “typically adopt 
                                                          
161 Schwarz (2003), p. 7. 
162 Ishida and Okuyama, supra note 154, p. 1184. 
163 Applbaum, supra note 28, pp. 2–3. Cf. Sorensen and Funck (2007), p. 278. 
164 ibid., 5.  
165 Pekkanen, Tsujinaka and Yamamato supra note 16, p. 45. 
166 ibid., 109. 
167 Ibid. 
168 ibid., 83–108 and 113–4. 
169 Pekkanen, Tsujinaka, and Yamamoto supra note 16, pp. 59–108. Cf. Hashimoto supra note 26, pp. 230–2; 
Sorensen supra note 6, p. 122; Houwelingen (2012), p. 471. 
170 Pekkanen, Tsujinaka, and Yamamoto supra note 16, pp. 59–82 and 150–74. 
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a strategy of filling in the gaps in social service provision by local governments.”171 Sub-
contracting arrangements are the preferred route to perform this task as just-mentioned authors 
find that “almost all local government subcontract to NHAs”, 172  and further, that 
“commissioned services and collaboration with local governments are more frequently 
undertaken when NHAs regard local government policies as insufficient.”173 In addition, as Ito 
has showed, NAs have been developing self-referred problem-solving practices in isolation 
from local governments. 174  All these activities also serve to counter-balance the 
aforementioned political vacuum at the macro-level to the extent that to the increasing lack of 
political and social significance of public bodies there corresponds the growing self-reflective 
emergence and intensification at the micro level of spontaneous sites of rule-production and 
enforcement.175 Or, we may say with Teubner, NAs autopietically constitutionalise themselves 
through a self-reflective structural coupling that internalises external pressures.176  
Importantly, these micro-forms of relationality and responsibility feed back into renewed 
modes of subjective well-being177—a finding which is indirectly confirmed by how social 
distance factors increase the emergence and spread of precarity, marginalisation, and 
depression phenomena. “People who are different in social backgrounds from their neighbors,” 
Daisuke Takagi et al observe, “are vulnerable to depression because they cannot acquire 
sufficient supportive networks and cannot perceive collective efficacy due to deficiency of 
interactions with their neighbors.”178  
What about law and legal analysis, then? As normative (including legal) pluralism is a social 
fact,179 it comes as no surprise that legal scholars have not failed to explore the pivotal role that 
both state law and non-state regulatory instruments play, or might play, in the development of 
                                                          
171 Ibid., 109. 
172 Ibid., 147. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ito supra note 15, p. 169. 
175 Pekkanen, Tsujinaka, and Yamamoto supra note 16, p. 151. This also explains why, since the 1990s, NAs’ 
activities have been supported by decentralisation movements. See ibid., 18. 
176 This also applies to the very formative period of present-day NAs, the 1920s. See Schmidtpott, supra note 25. 
177 Hashimoto supra note 26, p. 226; Pekkanen & Tsujinaka (2008); Yūko, Pekkanen, and Yutaka (2012), p. 85; 
Matsushima & Matsunaga (2015); Yoji Inaba et al (2015). But see Tiefenbach & Holdgrün (2015). 
178 Daisuke Takagi et al (2013), p. 86. 
179 Brennan et al (2013), p. 3; Cotterrell (2017), p. 22. 
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civic participation bonds in Japan’s societal life. 180  While the debate on the nature and 
declensions of these societal instances of transformative politics has proved to be particularly 
insightful from several perspectives of inquiry, the question that still needs to be answered is 
what analytical model would assist commentators assess the legal character of this sort of 
shared actions, voluntary organisations, and interpersonal modes of social responsibility.  
Yet, it might be objected with good reason that the heterogeneity of the phenomena in 
question renders it particularly difficult (if not inappropriate) to frame a unique and all-
embracing analytical framework. The very path pursued by this article might therefore be 
deemed not worth considering. To such criticism, it might be responded by noting that while 
Teubner’s societal picture allows to inscribe the Japanese’s micro-relational arrangements 
within the purview of legal pluralism, such categorisation would only be acceptable at a very 
general level of abstraction. Analytical accuracy and coherence would indeed require us to 
comprehend that opting for Teubner’s theory of constitutional differentiation would lead to 
conclude that such pluralist instances not only meet the threshold of legality, but also the higher 
and more rigid one of constitutionality.181 In this sense, and to be more precise, a Teubnerian 
analytic would allow interpreters to conceptualise such micro-relational conglomerates not 
merely as, drawing from Griffths, might be defined as self-autonomous loci of legal-regulatory 
activity.182 Rather, they would have to be considered as full-fledged constitutional sites.  
Further, and relatedly, opting for a Teubnerian approach to the subject would allow 
interpreters to extend the notionistic purview of what amounts to “law” in Japan to a whole 
series of normatively heterogeneous183 phenomena which, under the influence of conventional 
(i.e. positivistic and state-based) assumptions, would not be categorised as such. As a result, 
the formation and functioning of the micro-relational regulatory dynamics such as those 
underpinning NAs that Hasegawa categorises as non-legal would have to be re-thought as 
representing “islands of the constitutional” in Teubnerian terms—i.e. constitutional loci of 
inter-subjective, self-reflective consciousness and communication processes. Thus, and as can 
                                                          
180 Among others, see Feeley & Miyazawa supra note 37, p. 179. In sociological literature, see Salamon & Toepler 
(2000). 
181 Teubner, supra note 43, p. 110. 
182 Griffiths, supra note 47; id. (2003), p. 24. 
183 Griffiths, supra note 47, p. 38. 
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be easily imagined, moving away from “legal centralist”184  demarcations has meaningful 
implications for scholars’ ability to analytically assess the relationship between the growing 
“legal consciousness” of the Japanese and the formation of societal forums of civil activity and 
responsibility.185  
 
 
B. Questioning Teubner’s Societal Analytic 
 
That it is for the (comparative) sociology of law to take the above considerations further should 
be obvious186—particularly if we bear in mind the “sociological turn in constitutionalism”187 
and agree with Griffiths that the “theoretical object” of socio-legal analysis is “social 
control”188 and focus on the ordering function played by the micro-sites of rule production at 
the centre of this article. Whether or not choosing Teubner’s societal model as a conceptual 
framework for our comparative analysis is, however, another question and open to discussion 
(if not controversy). The argument pursued here is that Teubner’s constitutional picture is 
worth exploring to the extent that it helps us systematise (and thus, comprehend) different 
normative orders and regulatory regimes in an age, such as ours, characterised by increasing 
regulatory density, complexity, and uncertainty. This is due to the fact that Teubner specifically 
framed his socio-legal paradigm to overcome the difficulties that classic constitutional theory 
has shown in trying to decipher the proliferation and divergence of isolated alternatives to the 
modern constitutional project, even in Japan. 
As it was seen, indeed, while Teubner elaborated his societal constitutionalism primarily for 
the global and transnational environment, its utility for the purposes of our study lies in the 
way he has re-worked the “state/society” dichotomy by blending together different group and 
complexity theory arguments. Teubner’s inter-disciplinary approach allows interpreters to 
make use of the societal constitutionalism paradigm for (potentially) all sub-levels of ordering, 
including those discussed here. That having been said, however, analytical accuracy requires 
                                                          
184 Galanter (1981), p. 17. Griffiths, supra note 47. 
185 Cf. Cotterrell (1998), pp. 190–1. 
186 Cf. Zweigert & Kötz (1998), p. 11. 
187 Blokker & Thornhill (2017), p. 6. 
188 Griffiths (2017), p. 105. 
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us to consider some of the criticism that has been raised against it. Two very similar critical 
appraisals are of particular interest for the scope of our discussion: Emilio’s Christodoulidis’ 
“internal critique of . . . the constitutional and political dimensions”189 of Teubner’s theory, and 
Ming-Sung Kuo’s criticism regarding how far has Teubner extended the concept of constitution 
to account for informal modes of group-formation and ordering.190 
Christodoulidis’ and Kuo’s reviews of Teubner’s account share a common concern about 
the consequences implied by a shift from empirically-based constitutionalism to abstract 
constitutionalisation. Christodoulidis contends that “constitutionalization, as an ongoing 
process, undercuts what we typically associate with the constitutional, which is its framing 
function.”191 More particularly, while noting that “the great novelty of [Teubner’s] theory is to 
withdraw the primacy of the legal”192 from the purview of scholarly discourse on the subject, 
what Christodoulidis thinks Teubner’s societal constitutionalism fails to grasp is that  
 
the meaning of the constitutional points to a certain function of “containment” 
along the social, temporal, and material axes [shaping such meaning]. These are 
threshold requirements for ascribing constitutional meaning. Uploaded to the level 
of transnational societal constitutionalism, they become unsettled, as they become 
subject to a number of extraordinary reconfigurations in all three dimensions.193 
 
This feature of sectorial constitutions leads Christodoulidis to maintain that if, as in Teubner’s 
case, 
 
constitutionalization is merely the name of what “hardens” into concepts that 
acquire some form of orientation value for the system in response to societal stimuli 
(be they protests or conflicts) as it surges on along the trajectory of its self-
reproduction, then we sacrifice the possibility to draw distinctions on a political-
societal register.194 
 
Although he never cites nor indirectly refers to Christodoulidis’ critique, Kuo argues similarly 
while targeting the shift, at the centre of Teubner’s model, from the constitution as we know it 
                                                          
189 Christodoulidis (2013). 
190 Kuo (2014). 
191 Christodoulidis, supra note 189, p. 632. 
192 Ibid., 647. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid., 650. 
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to the (somehow intangible) autopoietic processes of constitutionalisation. Categorising 
Teubner’s picture as a “constitutional wonderland,” 195  Kuo’s intent is to challenge the 
constitutional credentials of Teubner’s theory by showing that his analytic implies a semantic 
deception which ultimately affects its ability “to offer an alternative constitutional vision for 
political ordering”196 in contemporary society. “Teubner’s version of global constitutionalism,” 
Kuo affirms, 
 
is semantic as the world order comprising constitutional fragments he envisages is 
disembedded from political, discursive communities of self-determination. With 
functional autonomisation in the place of political self-determination, Teubner’s 
constitutional wonderland appears to be steeped in an endless process of 
constitutionalisation without the constitution as we know it, albeit still overloaded 
with constitutional trappings.197 
 
What renders Teubner’s pluralist model problematic, if not completely inadequate, then, is 
what is hidden in his methodology of inquiry, i.e. the fact that is purposively moulded to sustain 
his imaginary vision of societal conglomerates’ formation and functioning. Paradigmatic of 
this empirical indeterminism, over-inclusive functionalism, and lack of conceptual appeal is 
the role that Teubner assigns to the constitutional actor which, in the above-mentioned 
“moment of crisis” where the social sub-area (supposedly, according to Kuo) autopoitetically 
constitutes itself through a self-reflective cutting and judging to immunise itself from a vital 
threat, “seem[s] to be left alone” 198  in her newly discovered capacity as “super civic 
republican.”199 
Christodoulids’ and Kuo’s critiques are both strategic to the extent that they tackle central 
and pervasive themes concerning the empirical accuracy and theoretical soundness of 
Teubner’s genealogical reconstruction of the constitutional moment as a protective response in 
the face of an entropic, existential risk. As such, they also shed new light on sociology of law’s 
commitment and ability to offer specialised frameworks of logical understanding which allow 
                                                          
195 Kuo supra note 190, p. 160. 
196 Ibid., 160. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid., 169. 
199 Ibid., 173. 
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both theorists and practitioners to engage with one another and construct a (more or less) shared 
knowledge of reality based on (more or less) shared standards of rationality. However, an 
engagement with all their aspects would require a more extensive treatment than can be 
provided here. It will suffice to note while certainly dynamic (i.e. the constitution as a process), 
Teubner’s sectorial constitutions do not lack the framing properties of canonical constitutions 
for the simple reason that, if that would not be the case, the constitutionalisation (i.e. formation 
and structuring in constitutional terms) of societal sub-areas could never occur 
phenomenologically.  
Not coincidentally, it might be added, throughout his scholarship to date Teubner has given 
several examples to demonstrate the constitutional (rather than merely legal) character of 
societal sub-areas whose formation and relational regulative regimes transcend the conceptual 
safety net attached to the “public-private” dichotomy. As it was seen, these include the 
economy, science, health, mass media, and so forth—all sub-systems which are not only 
ontologically constituted, but which also perform constitutional functions within their subject 
areas. If we agree that constitutions are self-reflective communicative processes through which 
societal arenas are autopoietically ontologised so that the political life of communities can 
express itself, then NAs too can be efficiently categorised as sectorial constitutions in 
Teubnerian terms.200  
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Not only legal pluralists, but also legal comparatists, positivists and post-positivists have in the 
past two decades come to stress that a full comprehension of the legal dimension requires us 
to, first, move beyond state-centred categorisations; and secondly, embrace a relational account 
of law’s existence and content. Thus, in advocating a new taxonomy for the comparative study 
of law(s), Ugo Mattei has observed that “any social structure . . . is also a legal structure.”201 
Turning away from his much-debated reductive focus on state law, exclusivist legal positivist 
                                                          
200 Cf. Pekkanen, Tsujinaka, and Yamamoto, supra note 16, p. 69, where we read that “NHAs are the foundation 
of local communities.” Emphasis added. 
201 Mattei, supra note 23, p. 19. 
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Joseph Raz has recently urged theorists to take into account “other kinds of law”202  and 
significantly, “the rules and regulations governing the activities of voluntary associations.”203 
In framing a socio-legal positivist account that draws while also departing from HLA Hart’s 
state-based conventionalism, Brian Tamanaha has asserted that “[l]aw is whatever people 
identify and threat in their social practices as law (or droit, retch, etc.).”204 More particularly, 
to Tamanaha, “[l]aw is a social historical growth – or, more precisely, a complex variety of 
growths – tied to social intercourse and complexity.”205 Similarly, in his recent post-positivist 
account of the legal dimension, Alexander Somek asserted that “[l]aw is first and foremost a 
relation between and among people.”206  
Any such claim would, however, risk being sacrificed at the altar of analytical rigour if the 
requirements for a social practice or a relational encounter to be, first, recognised and, then, 
conceptualised as “law” are not clearly set out and met. The argument pursued by this article 
is that a cross-cultural approach to Teubner’s societal constitutionalism is the most accurate 
framework one can deploy to conceptualise and operationalise the formation and functioning 
of Japan’s new micro-sites of relationality and responsibility. In particular, starting from the 
assumption that societal dynamics are phenomena to be explored in their historical and 
contextual contingency, this article has called for a contextualisation of Teubner’s societal 
analytic of functional differentiation and constitutional quality tests from the perspective of 
Hasegawa’s empirical studies on the regulatory regimes of NAs as micro-relational 
communities.  
As discussed, the strength of Teubner’s societal analytic lies not only in its explanatory 
value, but also, and more significantly, in its ability to offer a juristic framework within which 
some of the complex phenomena of social normativity can be recognised, assessed, and 
operationalised. Teubner is, of course, well aware that there are many controversial questions 
which constitutional sociology, including his own one, has yet to answer.207 Hence he concedes 
                                                          
202 Raz (2017), p. 138. See also ibid., 144. 
203  Ibid., 138. Raz, however, still considers the state as “the most comprehensive legally based social 
organisation”. Ibid., 137. 
204 Tamanaha (2001a), p. 169. More generally, see ibid., 133–70; id. (2001b).  
205 Tamanaha (2017), p. 3. 
206 Somek (2017), p. 20. 
207 Teubner, supra note 58, p. 315. 
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that his “capillary constitutionalisation” cannot but be experimental.208 This might help the 
dialogue with those critics such as Christodoulidis and Kuo, who point at the model’s 
epistemological relativism and over-inclusiveness. In any case, few would disagree that 
Teubner’s merit is to have shifted our focus from the “legal-political” dialectic of modern 
constitutional studies to all those processes of self-constitutionalisation which take place 
outside the traditional channels of modern analytical constructs (i.e. the constitution not, or not 
only, as a text but rather as a self-reflexive practice that expresses a communicative potential). 
Through societal constitutionalism’s lenses, Teubner observes drawing from Koselleck, “[t]he 
fundamental structures of civil society would have to be treated in terms of constitutional 
politics as equal to the structures of the state constitution.”209 This is because “[i]n contrast to 
the simple juridification of social sub-areas, we may only speak of their constitutionalization 
once legal norms have assumed th[e] dual function [of foundation of an autonomous order and 
its self-limitation].” 210  It can hardly be disputed that NAs’ foundational and regulatory 
dynamics as well as self-referred problem-solving practices do not meet these requirements—
particularly if we bear in mind the self-immunising, constitutional function that, as displayed 
in Hasegawa’s case studies, NAs exert when faced with a vital threat (or entropic, existential 
moment of crisis in Teubnerian terms).  
As it was seen, the proposed theoretical move allows interpreters first to tackle the 
difficulties implied in the usability of analytical concepts in cross-cultural dialogue; and 
secondly, to push the debate on pluralist normative configurations in Japan beyond the 
conventional state-centric horizon. It does so to the extent that it provides the analytical 
background against which categorise the micro-relational forms of cohesion, solidarity, and 
responsibility that the Japanese have been developing as full-fledged constitutional sites. The 
reason for this should be obvious: if what this article argues is correct, such pluralist instances 
of organised societal life would not only meet the threshold of legality, but also the higher and 
more rigid one of constitutionality. Importantly, opting for Teubner’s pluralist analytic would, 
in turn, not only enhance the theoretical and practical comprehension of Japan’s polity’s inner 
                                                          
208 Teubner, supra note 68, p. 58. 
209 Teubner, supra note 43, p. 16. 
210 Ibid., 18. 
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dynamics. More significantly, it would also assist commentators in initiating a communal effort 
from which the scholarly dialogue on the subject, and thus, the mutual understanding between 
the Japanese and Western legal traditions, would ultimately benefit. 
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